The Insanity Defense in Virginia: An Evaluation by Gravely, Steven D.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 5
1982
The Insanity Defense in Virginia: An Evaluation
Steven D. Gravely
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond
Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven D. Gravely, The Insanity Defense in Virginia: An Evaluation, 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 129 (1982).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss1/5
COMMENTS
THE INSANITY DEEENSE IN VIRGINIA: AN EVALUATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinckley, Jr. attempted to assassinate
Ronald Reagan, the thirty-ninth President of the United States. More
than fifteen months after his arraignment Hinckley was found "not guilty
by reason of insanity" to each of the thirteen counts with which he was
charged.1
Hinckley's successful use of the insanity defense2 has rekindled a de-
bate that has raged for centuries concerning the rationality and propriety
of the insanity defense.3 The controversy stems not only from the fact
that the insanity defense is seldom used except in grievous felonies, spe-
cifically homicide, or spectacular crimes such as Hinckley's, 4 but also
from the manner in which the defense assails society's notion of the indi-
vidual's moral accountability for his actions.5 Indeed it was during a spe-
cial session of the House of Lords following public outcry over the acquit-
tal of Daniel M'Naghten in the murder of Edward Drummond,' that the
famous insanity test of M'Naghten's Case' was articulated.
For all its notoriety the insanity defense remains a surprisingly nebu-
lous concept, defined differently in each jurisdiction. A workable defini-
tion has been provided by Abraham S. Goldstein: "The insanity defense
refers to that branch of the concept of insanity which defines the extent
1. Taylor, Too Much Justice, HARPER'S, Sept. 1982, at 56.
2. Technically, the accused enters a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" to the
crimes with which he is charged.
3. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 4 (1967); see, e.g., Clanon, Shawner &
Kurdys, Less Insanity in the Courts, 68 A.B.A. J. 824 (1982); Stanfiel, The Questionable
Sanity of the Insanity Defense, 8 BARRISTER Spring 1981, at 19. (These articles provide a
good example of recent treatment of this area in current professional literature.)
4. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 24.
5. See H. FNGARETrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 7 (1972).
6. Edward Drummond was actually the private secretary to Sir Robert Peel, Prime Minis-
ter of England at the time. It developed at his trial that M'Naghten intended to murder the
Prime Minister whom he blamed for a whole system of persecution (a delusion) of which
M'Naghten fancied himself a victim. M'Naghten was under the delusion that he was shoot-
ing Peel when he murdered Drummond. Lyons, Responsibility Without Individual Respon-
sibility?: The Controversy Over Defining Legal Insanity, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 391, 393
(1974).
7. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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to which men accused of crime may be relieved of criminal responsibility
by virtue of mental disease."
The insanity defense, however defined, has become intimately associ-
ated with the fundamental safeguards of the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Palko v. Connecticut,9 the United States Supreme Court
held that criminal procedures which are deeply rooted in the traditions of
Anglo-American justice are constitutionally required. In Wolf v. Colo-
rado,10 the Court held the fact that a majority of states employ a particu-
lar procedure is strong evidence that the due process clause encompasses
the procedure. This line of reasoning has led the state courts to void, as
violative of due process safeguards, legislative attempts to abolish the in-
sanity defense.1"
Given the historical controversy and the renewed interest since the
Hinckley trial, this comment focuses upon the insanity defense as it cur-
rently is applied in Virginia. Since contemporary issues are often best un-
derstood in light of their historical antecedents, the comment first pro-
vides a review of the conceptual foundation of the insanity defense in
America, culminating in a survey of the current tests. The focus then
shifts to Virginia statutory and case law development of the defense. Vir-
ginia's approach is compared to the approaches taken by other jurisdic-
tions in terms of current issues and questions surrounding the insanity
defense. While placing emphasis on Virginia authority, the discussion di-
gresses at times to analyze relevant federal authority addressing constitu-
tional issues involving the insanity defense.
This comment does not discuss the issue of an accused's competency to
stand trial. Although an issue clearly involving the accused's mental con-
dition,1 2 these are separable issues as recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court in Jackson v. Indiana.13
8. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 9.
9. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 793 (1969).
10. 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949), overruled on other grounds, Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961).
11. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910); Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142,
132 So. 581 (1931). The Idaho legislature recently abolished the insanity defense in that
state. See infra note 59. The constitutionality of this statute is not yet under review. See
infra note 60.
12. The law is well settled everywhere that an individual must be competent to stand
trial. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *24 to the effect that an incompetent accused should not be tried since he cannot
adequately prepare his defense); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-167 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
13. 406 U.S. 715, 739 (1972).
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II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Changing Focus of the Insanity Defense
The rule articulated by Lord Chief Justice Tindall in M'Naghten's
Case,14 that a man is not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the
offense, he could not distinguish right from wrong, is generally considered
the watershed of the modern insanity defense.15 In reality, the concept
predates M'Naghten'6 by thousands of years.17 The ancient Hebrews ac-
knowledged the distinction between the intentional and unintentional
crime and absolved both children and the insane of criminal liability for
their actions.' 8 Plato did not distinguish between voluntary and involun-
tary acts, but he did acknowledge that "calculated harms deserved sev-
erer sanction than those committed in passion."19 On the other hand, Ar-
istotle felt that knowledge of right and wrong was the test of
responsibility. 0 The similarity between Aristotle's formulation and the
M'Naghten "right-wrong" test is striking." Justinian also recognized that
the insane deserved privileged legal status. By the time of the codification
of his work in the sixth century, this had become an established
14. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
15. For the literal text of the test and an expanded discussion of it, see infra notes 31-38
and accompanying text.
16. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
17. England had attempted to dispose of the matter by statute in The Criminal Lunatics
Act of 1800, 40 Geo. 3, c.94, which was enacted in direct response to the public outcry fol-
lowing the acquittal of James Hadfield in Regina v. Hadfield, 27 Howell's St. Tr. 1281
(1800). The statute allowed juries to acquit on the basis of insanity but required that the
person so acquitted be held in custody. Unfortunately, the juries of the day declined to
declare the basis of their acquittal to be insanity thereby invoking the confinement provi-
sions, preferring instead to move for simple acquittal which resulted in the defendant's re-
lease. Eule, The Presumption of Sanity: Bursting the Bubble, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 637, 643
n.27, 646 n.50, 647 (1978). When, in 1843, Daniel M'Naghten was acquitted, the public out-
rage was so intense that a special session of the House of Lords was convened at which all
fifteen common law judges of England were questioned as to the parameters of the insanity
defense. Gerber, Is the Insanity Defense Insane?, 20 AM. J. JURmS. 111, 117 (1975). See infra
note 33.
18. "A deaf mute, an idiot and a minor are awkward to deal with, as he who injures them
is liable.., whereas if they injure others they are exempt." TIm BABYLoNuN TALMU, BABA
KAMA 501-2 (Epstein ed. 1935), quoted in Gerber, supra note 17, at 113 n.5. See also Wei-
ner, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Sane Approach, 56 Cm.[-]KFNT L. REv. 1057,
1058 n.8 (1980).
19. Gerber, supra note 17, at 113 n.6.
20. Id. at 113 n.8.
21. The M'Naghten test is popularly known as the "right-wrong test" for its supposed
emphasis on the accused's cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong at the time of
the offense. Indeed, it is this emphasis on cognition which has led many to criticize the
M'Naghten test as too simplistic. See Gerber, supra note 17, at 121; accord Comment, The
Spirit of M'Naghten, 9 GONZ. L. REv. 806, 813 (1974). But see A. GoLDsTEmn, supra note 3,
at 49 (suggesting that M'Naghten's alleged focus solely on cognition is unsupported by a
literal reading of the test).
1982]
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concept. 2
Despite this long-standing tradition, insanity did not constitute a de-
fense to criminal conduct at early English common law; rather, it served
as a basis for pardon by the Crown." This approach of treating insanity
as a basis for mitigating punishment prevailed in some form into the
early nineteenth century when English courts began to recognize insanity
as a defense well before M'Naghten.24
Viewed in this fashion, the-history of the insanity defense more closely
resembles a patchwork quilt than the systematic development of a mod-
ern criminal justice tenet. Two themes consistently are woven through
the ancestral fabric of the defense, however, resulting in a virtual symbio-
sis today. The first theme is the requirement that certain acts may be-
come crimes only when coupled with the proper mens rea on the part of
the actor.2 5 The United States Supreme Court, in Dennis v. United
States, 28 noted that "[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather
than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurispru-
dence. '27 The second theme is that insanity destroys the defendant's ca-
pacity to form a mens rea, thereby preventing the prosecution from es-
tablishing that a "crime" actually occurred. Through the mechanism of
the insanity defense, these two themes collide, sometimes with shattering
force.
The insanity defense is a process in constant flux.2 This perception is
described by Goldstein:29 "The insanity defense marks the transition
from the adequate man the law demands to the inadequate man he may
be."30 Hence, the focus of the insanity defense should change, indeed,
22. Gerber, supra note 17, at 113 n.9.
23. Id. at 114 n.14.
24. Id. at 116 n.26.
25. See LAFAvE & ScoTT, CRimiNAL LAW § 28 (1972) (extensive treatment of the role of
intent in criminal law). See also A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 203 (suggesting that the law
requires that a criminal act be more than a mere "muscle contraction" and pointing out that
the Model Penal Code now defines a crime as a "voluntary" act).
Mens rea equals criminal intent according to Gerber, supra note 17, at 131. He points out
that the Model Penal Code, and most states, identify three forms of mens rea: (1) intention-
ally acting towards a conscious criminal goal; (2) knowingly acting with an awareness of the
circumstances of an act; and (3) recklessly acting with an awareness that some dangerous
results are likely.
26. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
27. Id. at 500.
28. The Supreme Court, in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968), stated that "[the
doctrines of actus reus, mens reus, insanity, mistake, justification and duress have histori-
cally provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the
evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical
views of the nature of man."
29. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3.
30. Id. at 18.
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must change over time if it is to continue to fulfill its essential purpose.
Against the backdrop of historical perspective, the dominant tests for in-
sanity are considered.
B. M'Naghten's Case and Beyond: The Modern Tests
M'Naghten's Case3 1 represented the first successful attempt at articu-
lating a comprehensive judicial standard for the insanity defense.3 2 The
response of Lord Chief Justice Tindal to the inquiries by the House of
Lords33 has become the accepted statement of the rule which states in
pertinent part:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved, that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.34
M'Naghten35 remains the standard in Great Britain 8 and continues to
enjoy widespread application in the United States, although it is no
31. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
32. For a review of legislative efforts to develop a rational approach to the insanity de-
fense, see supra note 17.
33. Recall that the special session of the House of Lords was convened due to public
outrage at M'Naghten's acquittal. See supra note 17. At the session the judges were directed
to respond to the following five questions:
1st. What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with
insane delusion in respect of one or more particular subjects or persons; as, for in-
stance, where, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew
he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the
influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or
injury, or of producing some supposed public benefit? 2nd. What are the proper ques-
tions to be submitted to the jury when a person, alleged to be afflicted with insane
delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the
commission of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?
3rd. In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's state
of mind at the time when the act was committed? 4th. If a person under an insane
delusion as to existing facts commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby
excused? 5th. Can a medical man, conversant with the disease of insanity, who never
saw the prisoner previously to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial,
and the examination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of the
prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion
whether the prisoner was conscious at the time of doing the act that, he was acting
contrary to law, or whether he was labouring under any and what delusion at the
time?
10 Cl. & F. 200, 210-11, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722-23 (1843), quoted in Gerber, supra note 17, at
117, n.30.
34. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843), quoted in Gerber, supra note 17, at
117-18.
35. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
36. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 45.
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longer the majority test.3 7 However, it also has been the focus of intense
criticism for its emphasis on the cognitive ability of the accused, which
according to critics, limits its applicability." As a result, some jurisdic-
tions have developed other approaches to the insanity defense.
One alternative to M'Naghten can be found in the so called "irresisti-
ble impulse" test, which excuses wrongdoing by an individual, even
though he knew it was "wrong," if he acted under an impulse which he
could not resist. 9 The conceptual basis of this test encompasses circum-
37. The following fifteen states currently use the M'Naghten test only- Arizona-State v.
Heath, 122 Ariz. 36, 592 P.2d 1302 (1979); Florida-Wheeler v. State, 362 So. 2d 377 (Fla.
App. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979); Kansas-In re Jones, 228 Kan. 90, 612 P.2d
1211 (1980); Louisiana--State v. Ray, 395 So. 2d 664 (La. 1981); Minnesota-State v. Lin-
der, 304 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. 1981); Mississippi-Hill v. State, 339 So. 2d 1382 (Miss. 1976);
Nebraska-State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878
(1977); Nevada-Poole v. State, - Nev. ., 625 P.2d 1163 (1981); New Jersey-State v.
Trantino, 44 N.J. 358, 209 A.2d 117 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 993 (1966); North Caro-
lina-State v. Jackson, 302 N.C. 101, 273 S.E.2d 666 (1981); Oklahoma-Eddings v. State,
616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); Pennsylvania-Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa.
305, 396 A.2d 1183 (1979); South Carolina--State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037 (1980); South Dakota-State v. Standing Soldier, 299 N.W.2d
568 (S.D. 1980); Washington-State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wash. App. 326, 617 P.2d 1041 (1980).
38. Critics maintain that for a mental affliction to qualify as a "disease of the mind"
under M'Naghten it must impair the cognitive function, i.e., the ability of the afflicted to
"know" the difference between right and wrong. This was entirely rational when M'Naghten
was decided since at that time cognition was, considered the highest intellectual function.
Gerber, supra note 17, at 120-21. However, some critics argue that M'Naghten violates the
eighth amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment since an insane defen-
dant could be imprisoned. Shadoan, Raising the Insanity Defense: The Practical Side, 10
AM. CraM. L. REV. 533, 545 (1972). But see A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 50 (very few
jurisdictions interpret the requirement that the accused "know" the difference between
right and wrong as limited to an inquiry into his cognitive ability alone but rather allow all
evidence bearing on the accused's sanity); accord I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 228 (1940) (when
insanity is in issue, any and all conduct of the person is admissible as evidence).
Critics respond that despite the fact that evidence of matters other than the accused's
cognitive ability may be admissible, strict jury instructions on the question of the accused's
sanity render the evidence irrelevant. Gerber, supra note 17, at 121. For example, in Vir-
ginia the jury instructions allow the jurors to consider all testimony, but they are not bound
to accept the opinions of experts. H VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL 319, 327
(Michie's 1979).
Goldstein argues that M'Naghten is not a narrow test by design, rather it has been made
so by the preconceptions of the lawyers and psychiatrists who apply it. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 3, at 64-66.
39. This test is nearly as old as M'Naghten. Its most eloquent articulation in the early
common law occurred in Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 527, 2 So. 854 (1887), in which the court
stated that even if the defendant knew right from wrong, he would not be held responsible if
the following conditions were met:
(1) If, by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost the power to
choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question as that
his free agency was at the time destroyed; (2) and if, at the same time, the alleged
crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect,
as to have been the product of it solely.
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stances in which the application of M'Naghten would not result in a find-
ing of insanity even though such a finding may be proper.4 The irresisti-
ble impulse test currently is employed, by a few jurisdictions, including
Virginia, as an adjunct to the M'Naghten test because it commonly is
perceived to expand the inquiry beyond the cognitive scope utilized by
M'Naghten.41
Dissatisfaction with M'Naghten prompted the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to advance another alterna-
tive in Durham v. United States.42 The so-called "Durham rule" was rad-
ical in its simplicity, stating simply that "an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or
mental defect. '43 However, if M'Naghten was susceptible to criticism for
its narrow focus, then Durham failed by giving juries no guidance at all.4
It was simply too broad. The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in United States v. Brawner,45 finally abandoned the
"Durham rule" by adopting in its place a slightly modified version of the
American Law Institute's (ALI) proposed rule of criminal responsibility.48
The ALI test essentially exculpates an accused from criminal responsi-
bility if he lacks the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his act or to conform his conduct to the standards of law.47
Id. at -, 2 So. at 866-67. For an alternate definition see Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373,
378 (1897).
40. The test is based on four assumptions:
First, that there are mental diseases which impair volition or self-control, even while
cognition remains relatively unimpaired; second, that the use of M'Naghten alone
results in findings that persons suffering from such diseases are not insane; third, that
the law should make the insanity defense available to persons who are unable to con-
trol their actions, just as it does to those who fit M'Naghten; fourth, no matter how
broadly M'Naghten is construed, there will remain areas of serious disorder which it
will not reach.
A. GoLDSTslN, supra note 3, at 67.
41. Gerber, supra note 17, at 123. But see A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 47 (The rele-
vant inquiry under M'Naghten is not limited to merely cognitive ability, thus the additional
focus supplied by irresistible impulse is superfluous). The following jurisdictions now use a
combination M'Naghten and Irresistible Impulse standard: Colorado-People v. Giles, 192
Colo. 240, 557 P.2d 408 (1976); Georgia-Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980);
New Mexico-State v. Marguez, 96 N.M. 746, 634 P.2d 1298 (1981); Virginia-DeJarnette v.
Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867 (1881); accord Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 70
S.E.2d 284 (1952).
42. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
43. Id. at 874-75.
44. A. GOLDSTEM, supra note 3, at 84.
45. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, at 66 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
47. The test is stated in full as follows:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as
a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
1982]
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While the ALI test captures the essential spirit of M'Naghten, it contains
some significant variances as well. Most notable is the substitution of the
word "appreciate" for M'Naghten's use of the word "know. '48 Still, this
test is not without its critics who allege that it tends to allow too many
defendants to "escape" via the insanity defense.4 Despite criticism, the
ALI test is the formulation adopted by a majority of jurisdictions in
America today, including the federal judiciary."
In addition to these alternatives to M'Naghten, a number of other tests
have been adopted in jurisdictions across the nation. In 1975, the Michi-
quirements of law. (2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct.
Id.
48. The substitution of the word "appreciate" for the word "know" arguably expands the
scope of inquiry beyond the defendant's cognitive abilities to include his "affect," or emo-
tional state, as well. But see H. FINGARETTE, supra note 5, at 149 (arguing that no "knowl-
edge criterion," including M'Naghten and ALI, can be an adequate measure of insanity).
The ALI test incorporates the irresistible impulse test into its framework. The test stops
short, however, of including sociopathic conduct within the definition of mental disease, a
move which radically would have expanded the applicability of the defense. See generally
A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 86-88.
49. Weiner, supra note 18, at 1063.
50. The ALI test is the approved rule in the following states: Alabama-Crawford v.
State, 377 So. 2d 145 (Ala.), af'd, 377 So. 2d 159 (Ala. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 448
U.S. 904 (1980); Alaska-Bordewick v. State, 569 P.2d 184 (Alaska 1977); Arkan-
sas-Lipscomb v. State, 271 Ark. 334, 609 S.W.2d 15 (1980); California-People v. Nicholas,
112 Cal. App. 2d 249, 169 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1980); Connecticut-State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626,
424 A.2d 293 (1979); Hawaii-HAwAi REV. STAT. § 704-400(1) (Repl. Vol. 1976); 1li-
nois-People v. Uppole, 97 Ill. App. 3d 72, 422 N.E.2d 245 (1981); Indiana-Law v. State, -
Ind. -, 406 N.E.2d 1185 (1980); Kentucky-Edwards v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 380
(Ky. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 999 (1977); Maine-State v. Bridge, 413 A.2d 937 (Me.
1980); Maryland-MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 25(a) (Repl. Vol. 1972); Massachu-
setts-Commonwealth v. Mattson, 377 Mass. 638, 387 N.E.2d 546 (1979); Missouri-State v.
Pennington, 618 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1981); Montana-State ex rel. Krutzfeldt v. District
Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit, 163 Mont. 164, 515 P.2d 1312 (1973) (adopts ALI but
substitutes "is unable" for "lacks substantial capacity" which makes this test stricter than
ALI); North Dakota-State v. Jensen, 251 N.W.2d 182 (N.D. 1972); Ohio-State v. Staten,
25 Ohio St. 2d 107, 267 N.E.2d 122, vacated in part, 408 U.S. 938 (1971); Oregon-State v.
Herrera, 286 Or. 349, 554 P.2d 184 (1979); Rhode Island-State v. Muir, - R.I. 432 A.2d
1173 (1981); Tennessee-Bums v. State, 591 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979);
Texas-Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Crim. 1978); Utah-State v. Dominquez, 564
P.2d 768 (Utah 1977); Vermont-State v. Howe, 136 Vt. 53, 386 A.2d 1125 (1978); West
Virginia-State v. Grim, 156 W. Va. 615, 195 S.E.2d 637 (1973), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Nuckolls, 273 S.E.2d 87, 90 (W. Va. 1980); Wisconsin-Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.75
(West 1971); Wyoming--State v. Kind, 595 P.2d 960 (Wyo. 1979).
The ALI test is also the rule followed by the federal courts. United States v. Gillis, 645
F.2d 1269 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United
States v. Davis, 592 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979); United States v.
Bodey, 547 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977); United States v. Free-
man, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1960).
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gan legislature created a new verdict entitled "guilty but mentally ill."95 1
This legislation was enacted in reaction to a finding by the Michigan Su-
preme Court that Michigan's automatic commitment procedure, following
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, was unconstitutional. 52
Though the constitutionality of this "guilty but mentally ill" verdict was
widely challenged as violative of the accused's constitutional rights,53 the
statute's constitutionality recently has been upheld.5 4
New York took a rather interesting approach when it recently enacted
the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980."' While maintaining a modified
M'Naghten e test as the standard,57 the act makes sweeping changes in
51. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West Supp. 1981). The standard is defined by the
statute as follows:
(1) If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with section 20a, the
defendant may be found 'guilty but mentally ill' if, after trial, the trier of fact finds
all the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
(a) That the defendant is guilty of an offense.
(b) That the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that
offense.
(c) That the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of that
offense.
Id. § 768.36(1) (West Supp. 1981).
52. People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974). For a complete discus-
sion of the constitutional issues surrounding automatic post-acquittal commitment statutes
see infra notes 115-126 and accompanying text. Less than a year after the abrogation of the
commitment procedure sixty-four inmates had been released from state hospitals following
commitment hearings at which they had been found sane. Two of these inmates committed
heinous crimes, one a rape and the other a murder, shortly after their release. The public
outrage impelled the Michigan legislature to adopt the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict.
This system allows a judge to sentence a defendant to a prison term which is served in a
forensic unit so long as the defendant remains mentally ill. The individual may be kept
confined in the mental institution after the expiration of his sentence if he is found danger-
ous at a civil commitment hearing. Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URB. L. 471 (1976).
53. See Sherman, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Retreat from the Insanity Defense, 7:2 AM.
J. L. & MED. 238, 256-60 (1981) (maintaining that the legislation is constitutionally defec-
tive for denying those convicted a due process hearing prior to institutionalization and for
abrogating the prisoner's eighth amendment rights, since without the statute he would be
acquitted); see also Comment, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill
Verdict, 12:1 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 188, 199 (1978) (arguing that the verdict violates a defen-
dant's "colorable constitutional right to acquittal" if insane, thereby running afoul of the
due process clause of the United States Constitution). But see Comment, supra note 52, at
489-96 (supporting the statute's constitutionality in light of the strong public interests, e.g.,
protecting society from dangerous mentally ill persons, served by the law and the lack of
any empirical support that prisoners suffer).
54. People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).
55. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980, ch. 548, 1980 N.Y. Laws 941.
56. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
57. The M'Naghten standard was modified in 1965 so that the accused had only to "lack
substantial capacity" to know or appreciate that his "conduct was wrong" in order to meet
the test. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1975).
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the manner in which the trial proceeds and in post-acquittal disposition.5
Finally, Idaho recently enacted a statute abolishing the insanity de-
fense.59 To date, the statute's constitutionality has not been challenged. 0
III. THE LAW IN VIRGINIA
A. The Insanity Test Defined
Relative to the confusion and turmoil characteristic of some jurisdic-
tions, the Virginia law on the insanity defense is well settled. 1 The semi-
nal case in Virginia regarding the insanity defense is DeJarnette v. Com-
monwealth.6 2 Although Virginia cases exist that predate DeJarnette,as it
was in this case that the supreme court first articulated the legal standard
for Virginia as follows:
But in every case, although the accused may be laboring under partial
insanity, if he still understands the nature and character of his act and its
consequences, and has a knowledge that it is wrong and criminal, and a
mental power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and to
know that if he does the act he will do wrong and receive punishment, and
possesses withal a will sufficient to restrain the impulse that may arise from
a diseased mind, such partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him from
responsibility to the law for his crimes."
The court adopted the basic M'Naghten5 test supplemented by an ir-
resistible impulse test. Significantly, the rule in M'Naghten's Case"8
58. The new statute allows the accused to forego a jury trial but still plead "[n]ot respon-
sible by reason of mental disease or defect." Halpern, Rachlin & Portnow, New York's In-
sanity Defense Reform Act of 1980: A Forensic Psychiatric Perspective, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 661,
663 (1981) (citing N.Y. MNmAL HYo. LAW § 1.03(20) (McKinney 1978)). The new statute
also allows for automatic detention of the mentally ill offender for thirty days following
acquittal to evaluate his condition prior to a disposition hearing. However, at the hearing
the burden is on the state to prove the acquittee remains dangerous or ill. Comment, Re-
forming Insanity Defense Procedures in New York: Balancing Societal Protection Against
Individual Liberty, 45 ALa. L. REy. 679, 696-699 (1981).
59. IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
60. Confirmed in telephone conversation with Clerk of Idaho Supreme Court, Boise,
Idaho on August 23, 1982.
61. While Virginia has followed the test for insanity stated in DeJarnette v. Common-
wealth, 75 Va. 867 (1881), potential changes in the test are presently being considered by
the Virginia Insanity Plea Task Force. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
62. 75 Va. 867 (1881).
63. Id. See Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860 (1871) (in which the court
held that the defendant, upon raising the insanity defense, carried the burden of proving his
insanity to the jury. Further, the defendant must do more than create a rational doubt in
the minds of the jury as to his sanity); accord Baccigalupo v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. (33
Gratt.) 807 (1880).
64. DeJarnette, 75 Va. at 878.
65. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
66. Id.
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places the dual tests of understanding the nature and character of his act
and of knowing the wrongfulness of his act in the disjunctive67 The state-
ment of Virginia's test in DeJarnette5 clearly places these two tests in
the conjunctive, thus requiring that both tests be met before an accused
may prevail on the insanity defense. To that extent Virginia's standard is
more rigorous than M'Naghten.69 But in a subsequent case, the court
seems to have retreated from this stance in holding that "[tihe only de-
gree of insanity which the law recognizes as an excuse for crime is ...
where the accused is unable to distinguish right from wrong. . . -70 The
court went on to limit the use of irresistible impulse, the second element
of DeJarnette,71 to that class of cases in which the first element is not
satisfied-where the accused is capable of understanding the nature and
consequences of his act and knows the act is wrong.7 2
The label "irresistible impulse" may actually be a misnomer since the
test is never applied in such a restrictive light.73 In Virginia, however, this
argument is invalid. Beginning in 1908 with Thurman v. Common-
wealth, 4 the Virginia courts consistently have interpreted the irresistible
impulse test narrowly. In affirming the defendant's murder conviction the
court noted that the "irresistible impulse to excuse crime must spring
from the mind, in other words, must be an insane impulse." 5 The federal
courts have reached a similar conclusion in applying Virginia law.76 Ulti-
67. That is to say that these are alternative tests under M'Naghten the satisfaction of
either being sufficient to meet the test. See Comment, supra note 21, at 809-10.
68. DeJarnette, 75 Va. at 878.
69. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). See H VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CRiMINAL 319 (Michie's 1979).
70. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 716, 70 S.E.2d 284, 291 (1952) (emphasis
added).
71. 75 Va. at 878. The court defines irresistible impulse as follows:
[A] moral or homicidal insanity, consisting of an irresistible inclination to kill or com-
mit some other offence-some unseen pressure on the mind, drawing it to conse-
quences which it sees, but cannot avoid, and placing it under a coercion which, while
its results are clearly perceived, it is incapable of resisting.
Id.
72. Thompson, 193 Va. at 717, 70 S.E.2d at 291. The court suggested another definition of
irresistible impulse found in 14 AM. JuR. Criminal Law § 35 (1938):
[A]n impulse induced by, and growing out of some mental disease affecting the voli-
tive, as distinguished from the perceptive, powers, so that the person afflicted, while
able to understand the nature and consequences of the act charged against him and
to perceive that it is wrong, is unable, because of such mental disease, to resist the
impulse to do it. It is to be distinguished from mere passion or overwhelming emotion
not growing out of, and connected with, a disease of the mind. Frenzy arising solely<
from the passion of anger and jealousy, regardless of how furious, is not insanity.
73. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 71. Goldstein suggests the term "impulse" in its jury
instructions. IE VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CImiNAL 319, 323 (Michie's 1979).
74. 107 Va. 912, 60 S.E. 99 (1908).
75. Id. at 917, 60 S.E. at 101.
76. Snider v. Smith, 187 F. Supp. 299, 302 (E.D. Va. 1960) (holding that if the defendant
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mately the jury must decide whether the accused acted under an irresisti-
ble impulse and whether he meets the M'Naghten77 standard of
DeJarnette.78 Further, the jury is not bound to accept as conclusive the
testimony of the defendant's expert psychiatric witness where there was
substantially conflicting evidence as to the defendant's actions, conduct
and appearance around the time of the offense.79
Virginia has remained steadfast in its definition of insanity despite the
furious storm swirling about it. In the case of Pamplin v. Common-
wealth,80 the supreme court voided a jury instruction which was inconsis-
tent with that of DeJarnette on the rationale that this would tend to
confuse juries.8'
The Virginia Insanity Plea Task Force8 2 is considering recommending
the abolition of the irresistible impulse element of DeJarnette as well as
enlarging the scope of the M'Naghten element.8 3 However, the resulting
test would not be so broad as ALI's.s4
planned his criminal act this would disallow the defense that he acted under "irresistible
impulse," aff'd sub nom. Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961). Accord Rol-
lins v.- Commonwealth, 207 Va. 575, 151 S.E.2d 622 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1026
(1967) (in which the Virginia court approved a jury instruction that a planned act by defen-
dant could not be the product of irresistible impulse as a matter of law).
77. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
78. 75 Va. 867 (1881).
79. McLane v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 197, 206, 116 S.E.2d 274, 281 (1960) (in which the
court held that a jury is entitled to give an expert the same weight as any other witness
taking into account his status as an expert); accord Christian v. Commonwealth, 202 Va.
311, 117 S.E.2d 72 (1960).
80. 167 Va. 468, 188 S.E. 147 (1936).
81. The alternative instruction read: "The court instructs the jury that if they believe
from the evidence that at the time of the alleged offense charged in the indictment, the
defendant was not of normal mind to know right from wrong, then you should acquit him."
Pamplin, 167 Va. at 468, 188 S.E. at 147.
82. This is a special study group commissioned by the General Assembly to evaluate the
state's criminal law relating to mental health, specifically insanity. The task force is com-
posed of psychiatrists, psychologists, attorneys and judges from Virginia. In 1981, the Vir-
ginia General Assembly adopted the group's suggested changes in the law regarding compe-
tency to stand trial. The 1982 session of the legislature will undertake the task force's
recommendations concerning the insanity defense.
83. Undated memorandum to all members of the task force from Chris Slobogin, Direc-
tor, Forensic Evaluation, Training and Research Center, Institute of Law, Psychiatry and
s Public Policy, University of Virginia. The suggested language of the new test is as follows:
A person accused of a crime shall be found not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the
time of the allegedly criminal conduct, his or her understanding of the wrongfulness
of the conduct was substantially impaired by mental disease or defect.
(Memorandum available in files of the Virginia Attorney General pertaining to the task
force.)
84. Id.
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B. The Presumption of Sanity and Burden of Persuasion
In Virginia a defendant is presumed sane until proven insane.8 5 The
Virginia Supreme Court consistently has affirmed this presumption. 6 The
federal courts, in applying Virginia law, specifically have endorsed the
concept in numerous cases.87
Despite its universal application, the presumption of sanity has en-
countered intense criticism as a concept which has outlived its utility.ss
Some suggest that the presumption has become so entrenched that it has
attained evidentiary status, which may severely prejudice a criminal de-
fendant attempting to assert an insanity defense.8 ' Despite articulate, al-
beit emotional, assaults upon the presumption of sanity, it stands as one
of the few concepts upon which every American jurisdiction agrees.90
The corollary of the presumption of sanity is that the defendant must
raise the issue of insanity at trial. As late as 1895, this requirement was
satisfied by simply entering a plea of "not guilty" to the charge.9 1 The
procedure is substantially more complex today.92
85. Honesty v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 283 (1886). This concept is derived directly from
the language of M'Naghten which states that "every man is presumed to be sane and to
possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes." Eule, supra note 17, at
637 quoting M'Naghten. Eule also points out that the presumption of sanity predates
M'Naghten.
86. E.g., Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 70 S.E.2d 284 (1952).
87. E.g., Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1963).
88. Eule, supra note 17, at 637-38, advances three separate justifications for the presump-
tion: first, the so-called "common sense" justification based upon a rule of probability that
the defendant is sane; second, the "convenience" justification premised on the argument
that the burden of proving sanity in every case is too onerous for the state; and third, the
need to correct the imbalance created by the defendant's superior access to evidence regard-
ing his sanity.
Eule then attacks each justification. First, he questions the assumption that an admitted
murderer or rapist, for example, is sane, thereby undercutting the "common sense" justifica-
tion. Second, he asserts that given the rarity with which the insanity defense is raised, the
onerous burden placed on the state to prove the accused's sanity is largely mythical. See
Eule, supra note 17, at 651-55 (quoting an oft cited statistic that the insanity defense is
raised in only 2% of all criminal jury trials). Accord H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERiCAN
JuRY 300 (1966).
89. Specifically, Eule postulates two areas of danger to the defendant who raises the in-
sanity defense. First, the presumption alone may carry the government's case; and second,
in jurisdictions where the government maintains the burden of persuasion as to sanity, the
jury may become confused upon receiving an instruction as to the presumption of sanity.
Eule, supra note 17, at 697-98.
90. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 111.
91. Stover v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 780, 22 S.E. 874 (1895).
92. Pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-168 (Cum. Supp. 1982) a defendant who intends to
raise an insanity defense at trial must serve the Commonwealth with written notice of this
fact at least 10 days prior to trial. Note this requirement only applies to a defense of in-
sanity raised at trial. Pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982) the
issue of the defendant's sanity may be raised at any time after the defense counsel has been
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Once the defendant has raised the issue of his insanity, he is entitled to
a jury instruction as to that issue. Refusal by the trial court to give such
an instruction is reversible error.9 3 The trial court may raise the issue at
its own discretion if appropriate.
9 4
However, the real significance of the presumption of sanity is that the
defendant upon raising the defense, sustains the burden of proving his
insanity to the jury."5 In Virginia the issue of insanity is, therefore, an
affirmative defense" as opposed to a simple defense.9 7 This approach
retained or appointed and before trial.
The Insanity Plea Task Force is considering the extension of the 10 day notice require-
ment to 30 days to assist the prosecution in obtaining expert rebuttal evidence. See supra
note 83.
93. Lucas v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 599, 607, 112 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1960).
94. Elkins v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 336, 338, 157 S.E.2d 243, 244 (1967) (decided under
former VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-228 (1966) now VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-168.5 (Cum. Supp.
1982)).
95. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 316, 157 S.E.2d 185 (1967).
96. The defendant bears the burden of proof. This is the rule in about one-half of the
states, including Virginia, as follows: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 15-16-2 (1975)); Alaska (ALASKA
STAT. § i2.45.083 (1972)); Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-601 (1977)); California (CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 1369 (West 1980)); Delaware (DFL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4702-4704 (1974));
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 26-703 (1980)); Iowa (IowA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (1979)); Kentucky
(KY. REV. STAT. § 504.020 (1970)); Louisiana (State v. Weber, 364 So. 2d 952 (La. 1978));
Maine (State v. Buzynski, 330 A.2d 422 (Me. 1974)); Minnesota (State v. Finn, 257 Minn.
138, 100 N.W.2d 508 (1960)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.030, subd. 5 (Vernon 1967));
Montana (MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-503 (1947)); Nevada (Phillips v. State, 86 Nev. 720,
475 P.2d 671 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 628:2 (1979)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41 (West 1979)); North Carolina
(State v. Tillman, 22 N.C. App. 688, 207 S.E.2d 316 (1974)); Ohio (OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.39 (Page 1975)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 161.305 (1979)); Pennsylvania (Common-
wealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974)); Rhode Island (State v. Page, 104 R.I.
323, 244 A.2d 258 (1968)); South Carolina (State v. Cain, 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905
(1965)); Tennessee (Sparkman v. State, 4 Tenn. Cr. App. 189, 469 S.W.2d 692 (1970)); Texas
(TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 8.01 (1974)); Utah (State v. Holt, 22 Utah 2d 109, 449 P.2d
119 (1969)); Virginia (Taylor v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 316, 157 S.E.2d 185 (1967)); Wash-
ington (State v. Canaday, 79 Wash. 2d 647, 488 P.2d 1064 (1971), vacated on other grounds,
408 U.S. 940 (1972)); West Virginia (State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976)); Wis-
consin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (1971)). See also Note, Stopping the Revolving Door:
Adopting a Rational System for the Insanity Defense, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 973, 987 n.62
(1980).
97. The prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant's sanity after he raises the
issue. Approximately one-half of the states follow this approach: Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 11.1 (Supp. 1979)); Colorado (CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-103 (1978)); Connecticut
(State v. Vennard, 159 Conn. 385, 270 A.2d 837 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1011 (1971));
Florida (Farrell v. State, 101 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1958)); Hawaii (State v. Moeller, 50 Hawaii
110, 433 P.2d 136 (1967)); Idaho (State v. Myers, 94 Idaho 570, 494 P.2d 574 (1972)); Illinois
(People v. Gold, 38 Ill. 2d 510, 232 N.E.2d 702 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 940 (1968));
Indiana (Sceifers v. State, 267 Ind. 687, 373 N.E.2d 131 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 873,
reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 960 (1978)); Kansas (223 Kan. 766, 576 P.2d 682 (1978)); Maryland
(Brown v. State, 8 Md. App. 462, 260 A.2d 665 (1970)); Massachusetts (Commonwealth v.
Smith, 357 Mass. 168, 258 N.E.2d 13 (1970)); Michigan (People v. English, 29 Mich. App.
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places a greater burden on the defendant; some say an unconstitutionally
onerous burden.98 Nonetheless, it is interesting to speculate on how some-
one like John Hinckley would have fared in Virginia, faced with the bur-
den of persuasion.99
The defendant in Virginia must present evidence sufficient to satisfy
the jury that he was insane at the time he committed the offense. 100
Presenting a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough, 101 nor is evidence of
partial insanity.10 2 At least one commentator has suggested that the stan-
dard of proof in Virginia is a preponderance of the evidence.20'
The defense of insanity may be argued only if the defendant presents
evidence to support such a plea, it does not arise by operation of law.10 4
However, failure of defense counsel to raise the issue of defendant's
mental condition when a reasonable doubt exists as to his sanity does
constitute a denial of the defendant's right to effective assistance of coun-
sel.105 On the other hand, an accused who maintains his innocence can
certainly not be compelled to confess merely to assert an insanity
defense.20
The practice of placing the burden of proving insanity upon the defen-
dant has been challenged as violative of the due process clause of the
36, 185 N.W.2d 139 (1970)); Mississippi (Herron v. State, 287 So. 2d 759 (Miss.), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974)); Nebraska (State v. Jacobs, 190 Neb. 4, 205 N.W.2d 662, cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 860 (1973)); New Mexico (State v. Armstrong, 82 N.M. 358, 482 P.2d 61
(1971)); New York (N.Y. P.NAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1977)); Oklahoma (Whisenhunt v.
State, 279 P.2d 366 (Okla. 1954)); South Dakota (State v. Waugh, 80 S.D. 503, 127 N.W.2d
429 (1964)); Vermont (State v. Bishop, 128 Vt. 221, 260 A.2d 393 (1969)); Wyoming (Wyo
STAT. § 7-242.5 [7-11-305] (1975)).
98. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
99. Hinckley's trial occurred in the District of Columbia, a jurisdiction in which the bur-
den of proving the defendant's sanity rests with the prosecution.
100. Holober v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 826, 62 S.E.2d 816 (1951); see also Thomas v.
Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1963) (holding the state has the right to set the legal
test and the quantum of proof for insanity within the bounds of due process).
101. Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 219 S.E.2d 845 (1975); accord Longely v.
Commonwealth, 99 Va. 807, 37 S.E. 339 (1900); Hite v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 489, 37 S.E.
895 (1898); Honesty v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 283 (1886).
102. DeJarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 875 (1881).
103. Eule, supra note 17, at 670 n.162. But see United States v. Green, 468 F.2d 116 (4th
Cir. 1972) (in which the Fourth Circuit held, in a case arising in Virginia but applying fed-
eral law, that a defendant need only present slight evidence to raise the issue of his insanity
as a defense).
104. Green, 468 F.2d at 118. See supra note 100 for Virginia authority to the same effect.
105. Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566, 569 (4th Cir. 1967) (applying Virginia law); accord
Owsley v. Peyton, 368 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1966) (applying Virginia law). The Fourth Circuit
recently affirmed this position. Profitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1978); Wood
v. Zahradnick, 578 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1978).
106. Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683, 685 (4th Cir. 1961) (applying Virginia law).
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United States Constitution.' A series of apparently inconsistent deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court has significantly contributed
to the confusion.10 8 The Court, however, seems finally to have resolved
the issue in Patterson v. New York, 09 wherein the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a New York statute which requires a criminal defendant
to prove extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the
evidence. 1 0
Some commentators have lamented the seemingly irreconcilable posi-
tions advanced by the Court in this line of cases."' However, a close read-
ing of Justice Marshall's opinion in Powell v. Texas"'2 reveals that the
Court, as early as 1967, foresaw this paradox and was committed to a
conservative course."
3
107. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 17; Note, Due Process and the Insanity Defense: The
Supreme Court's Retreat from Winship and Mullaney, 54 IND. L.J. 95, 103 (1978).
108. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, reh'g denied, 344 U.S. 848 (1952) the Supreme
Court upheld an Oregon statute which required the criminal defendant to prove his asserted
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found that the statute did not offend any
basic standards of justice. Leland effectively overruled Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469
(1895) which had held that the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant was capable at law of having committed the crime. The Court in Leland, how-
ever, avoided this issue by holding that Davis was not a constitutional case; it merely cre-
ated a procedural rule for the federal courts.
Nearly two decades later the Supreme Court appeared to overrule their holding in Leland
through two cases decided only five years apart. The Court held in In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 368 (1970) that a New York delinquency statute was constitutionally defective for not
requiring the state to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency adjudica-
tory action. This decision was followed by Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) in which
the Court held void a Maine statute requiring a criminal defendant to prove "heat of pas-
sion" on the grounds that to so require compelled the defendant to negate malice afore-
thought, an element of the crime. The Court held that, based on Winship, the proper bur-
den was on the prosecution to prove the absence of "heat of passion." 421 U.S. at 703-04.
In the wake of these two decisions, the next logical step could have been a constitutional
mandate, based upon due process grounds, that a criminal defendant's sanity must be
proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. This specter led Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, to file a separate concurring opinion in Mullaney, 421 U.S.
at 704, reaffirming Leland, 343 U.S. 790, by distinguishing the Oregon statute from the one
at issue in Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 706. See Eule, supra note 17, at 677 n.209 and accompany-
ing text.
One year later a majority of the Court followed Rehnquist in Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S.
877 (1977), by declining to hear a due process challenge to Delaware's criminal code which
classified insanity as an affirmative defense.
109. 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (5-3 decision).
110. Where Rivera, 429 U.S. at 877 merely implied, Patterson, 432 U.S. at 197 made ab-
solutely clear that it is constitutionally permissible to place the burden of proving insanity
upon the defendant.
111. See Eule, supra note 17.
112. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
113. Justice Marshall stated:
Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into defining some
sort of insanity defense in constitutional terms.
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia law in Satterfield v.
Zahradnick,"4 affirmed the constitutionality of allocating the burden of
proof of insanity to the defendant. Thus it appears that Virginia's prac-
tice of placing upon the defendant the burden of satisfying the jury of his
insanity is constitutional.
C. Post-Acquittal Commitment
The insanity defense is unique from other affirmative defenses in that
the accused who is successful in asserting it can usually look forward to a
lengthy institutionalization." 5 This is not always true, however, and much
of the historical hostility towards the defense on the part of the general
public appears to be based upon the fear of dangerous persons being
released.116
A number of states, including Virginia, engaged in the practice of auto-
matically committing persons found not guilty by reason of insanity to
institutions. This approach was based on a presumption that insanity,
once proven at the time of the offense, continues until trial and beyond,
until the defendant can prove otherwise. 1
" 7
[F]ormulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not eliminate, that fruitful exper-
imentation, and forego the developing productive dialogue between law and psychia-
try into a rigid constitutional mold. It is simply not yet time to write into the Consti-
tution formulas cast in terms whose meaning, let alone relevance, is not yet clear to
doctors or to lawyers.
Id. at 536.
114. 572 F.2d 443 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 920 (1978). Technically the holding as
to the burden of proof is dicta since the primary basis of the appeal was the state's failure to
appoint a private psychiatrist of the defendant's choosing. However, the court noted that
placing the burden of proof for insanity on the defendant is clearly constitutional in light of
Rivera and Patterson.
115. It is for this reason that the defense is normally used only in cases where the accused
is facing a lengthy prison term if convicted. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 19. See also
Comment, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARv. L. REv. 605 (1981).
116. The hostility to the insanity defense is due in large part to the perception that the
insane offender is treated with greater leniency and is "back on the street" before his
sane counterpart. Whatever may be the validity of this thinking today, it was well-
founded in eighteenth and early nineteenth century England.
Eule, supra note 17, at 648-49. Accord, Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Develop-
ment and Contemporary Relevance, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 559, 577 (1972) (advancing the
position that modern juries continue to distrust the ability of the state and hospitals to
retain insanity acquittees until they no longer pose a danger to society); see Shadoan, supra
note 38, at 536 (suggesting that, in serious felony cases juries are hesitant to acquit since
they are unfamiliar with the post-acquittal procedure).
117. Note, The Virginia Procedure for Commitment and Release of Persons Acquitted
by Reason of Insanity, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185, 186-87 (1969). Predictably the states
are split on whether this presumption is rational. In support of this presumption, see In re
Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 485, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972). Indiana on the other hand
indulges in no such presumption. Wilson v. State, 259 Ind. 375, 287 N.E.2d 875 (1972)
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Automatic commitment has been challenged vigorously on both due
process and equal protection grounds.11 The analytical framework for
evaluating the constitutionality of post-acquittal commitment statutes is
now well settled, having been advanced in a trilogy of cases from the
United States Supreme Court and the well respected United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.'1 9
This line of authority led the Fourth Circuit to void the automatic
commitment statute for insanity acquittees employed by the state of Ma-
ryland in Dorsey v. Solomon.120 The court found that it constitutionally
was impermissible to commit an acquittee who merely had raised a rea-
sonable doubt as to his sanity at trial, without affording him a hearing. 2
The process in Virginia for commitment of insanity acquittees was
scrutinized recently by the Fourth Circuit in Harris v. Ballone.'22 The
court noted that Virginia had modified its commitment scheme following
(holding that, since the state bears the burden of proving the defendant's sanity at trial, his
acquittal by reason of insanity only shows that the state failed in its burden, but does not
justify a presumption that the defendant is actually insane).
118. The due process argument is premised on the deprivation of liberty without a sepa-
rate hearing. The equal protection argument focuses upon the different manner in which
criminal committees are treated from civil committees.
119. The first of these cases was Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) in which the
Court voided the automatic post-acquittal commitment statute for the state of New York.
The Court found that the statute's failure to provide for a proceeding which developed di-
rect evidence of the defendant's insanity made the statute fatally defective. Id. Relying on
Baxstrom, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Bol-
ton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968), held void an automatic commitment statute in
that jurisdiction on equal protection grounds. The court noted that the commitment process
was substantially dissimilar for civil committees and those acquitted by reason of insanity
without any rational basis for the distinction. Id. at 649. Accord Comment, supra note 115,
at 607 (arguing that a different standard for committing insanity acquittees than that used
for civil committees is not justifiable on the basis of protecting the community). But see
Note, supra note 96, at 1003 (advancing the proposition that persons acquitted by reason of
insanity are readily distinguishable from civil committees on at least two bases: first, the
insanity acquittee is not only insane but has committed crimes while insane; and second, the
acquittee is adjudged insane only after a full trial by jury). The court in Bolton, 395 F.2d at
651, maintained that a person acquitted on the basis of insanity must be given a judicial
hearing, prior to commitment, that is procedurally similar to those in civil commitment
proceedings.
Finally, in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1971), the Supreme Court voided an Indiana
statute which authorized commitment upon a determination by the judge that the accused
lacked the capacity to stand trial.
120. 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979).
121. At the hearing the acquittee is entitled to be represented by counsel and the burden
is upon the state to show that the person poses a present danger to himself or others. Id. at
275. It should be noted that the court found it proper for the state to place the burden of
justifying release on the acquittee so long as he was committed in a constitutionally permis-
sible manner. Id. at 274.
122. 681 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1982).
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Dorsey.11 3 The court held that the new Virginia standard requiring that
the judge be "satisfied" as to the acquittee's continued insanity or dan-
gerousness constitutionally was permissible. 2 4 The court also declined to
find an equal protection violation where standards used for acquittees
differed from those used for noncriminal committees. 1 5 Thus the current
Virginia post-acquittal commitment statute clearly passes constitutional
muster.
12
D. Enlarging the Scope of Insanity
Both M'Naghten"17 and ALP'2 speak of insanity in terms of a "disease
of the mind." While there is virtually no case authority defining the
term,' 1 9 there has been a general belief that the tests were limited to
psychoses."s0 In response to this perceived restriction, a movement has
existed for some time to expand the scope of insanity to include drug and
alcohol induced states as well as sociopathic behavior in general.''
The law is well settled in Virginia that voluntary drunkenness will not
123. Id. at 227. The new standard in Virginia is contained in VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181
(Cum. Supp. 1982) and provides that an acquittee shall be examined by a panel of three
experts after which a judicial hearing is held. If the judge is satisfied that the acquittee is
either insane or dangerous, he is committed to a mental hospital. He may apply for release
once per year beginnng six months after commitment.
124. 681 F.2d at 228. This is at least a preponderance of the evidence standard.
125. The standard for non-criminals is insane and dangerous, as opposed to insane or
dangerous for insanity acquittees. However, the court accepted the argument that since
prior criminal conduct on the part of the acquittee has been established, the lesser standard
is justified. Id.
126. Nonetheless the Task Force on the Insanity Plea is currently considering changing
the standard for criminal committees so as to be identical to that of non-criminals, i.e.,
insane and dangerous. Furthermore, the Task Force is considering the establishment of a
"two-tier" commitment procedure. Committees would be deemed "serious" or "non-serious"
offenders. "Serious" offenders would be subject to long-term commitment while "non-seri-
ous" offenders would be subject to commitment of one year. In both cases, after the commit-
ment expires the state could institute civil commitment proceedings. Memorandum, supra
note 83.
127. M'Naghten's case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
128. See supra note 46.
129. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 47.
130. See supra note 38. For purposes of this discussion "psychosis" is defined as a "state
of severe mental and emotional disorganization, characterized by, among other things, the
replacement or distortion of reality by delusions and hallucinations." M. BLINDER, PSYCHIA-
TRY IN THE EvERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW § 7.4(a) (2d ed. 1982). But see A. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 3, at 48, for the proposition that the tests do not operate to limit the "diseases" to
psychoses at all.
131. Sociopathy is defined as "chronic inability to conform one's behavior to social norms
... ." The difficulty with a sociopath is that he knows, cognitively speaking, when he is
breaking the law. BLINDER, supra note 130, at 314. This has led the ALI expressly to exclude
sociopathy from its definition of mental disease. See supra note 47.
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excuse criminal conduct. 32 This is consistent with the United States Su-
preme Court's finding in Powell v. Texas1 33 that alcoholism is not a
mental disease within the meaning of the insanity defense.134 Nonethe-
less, Virginia has long recognized that chronic alcoholism might render an
individual insane at which time he could avail himself of the insanity
defense.' 35
A more difficult case is presented by drug-induced insanity. This diffi-
culty stems, in large measure, from the Supreme Court's decision in
Robinson v. California,'" in which the Court held void a statute making
it a crime to be addicted to narcotics.1 37 Robinson was interpreted
broadly until the Court made clear in Powell that it did not intend to
grant wholesale immunity based on drug addiction or alcoholism. 38 The
modern rule was articulated by the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
McGough,39 a case arising from Virginia, in which the court stated that
drug dependence might qualify as a mental disease which could be as-
serted as a defense. 4  Nonetheless, it remains a question for the jury.""
In Proffitt v. United States"2 the Fourth Circuit affirmed its holding in
United States v. Chandler" that a criminal defendant's mental capacity
does not turn upon labels, such as sociopath or psychopath, and that
these conditions do not defeat an insanity defense per se.'1"
E. Psychiatric Examination of the Defendant
The Virginia Code sets forth a procedure for examination of an ac-
cused's mental state when there exists substantial question or when the
defendant gives notice of his intent to raise the insanity defense.'" In
132. Brenan v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 846, 850, 33 S.E.2d 639, 640 (1945).
133. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
134. Id. at 521-31, 535.
135. Longley v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 807, 37 S.E. 339 (1900). This decision was later
affirmed in Aren v. Peyton, 209 Va. 370, 375, 164 S.E.2d 691, 695 (1968) (the court noting
that voluntary drunkenness must be distinguished from the "settled insanity produced by
drink").
136. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
137. The Court found this violative of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment since the statute chose to punish a "status" as opposed to an act.
Id.
138. Powell, 392 U.S. at 521, 531-36.
139. 410 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1969).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 458-59.
142. 582 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980).
143. 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968).
144. Id. at 927.
145. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-168.1 (Cum. Supp. 1982) (evaluation on motion of the
Commonwealth when defendant intends to raise insanity defense); Id. § 19.2-169.5 (evalua-
tion upon substantial question of defendant's sanity at time of offense).
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these cases the court will appoint the psychiatrists and/or psychologists
who are paid by the Commonwealth. 4 ' The Virginia Supreme Court con-
sistently has held that the defendant is not entitled to a private psychia-
trist at public expense in addition to those supplied by the Common-
wealth. 147 This result has been approved by the Fourth Circuit in
Satterfield v. Zahradnick, which held that no constitutional duty exists
to appoint a private psychiatrist of defendant's choosing at public
expense. 4"
The Commonwealth, as noted, may request that the defendant undergo
a psychiatric examination once the defendant gives notice of his intent to
assert an insanity defense. 149 If the trial defendant refuses to cooperate
with the evaluation, the court may bar the defendant from presenting
expert psychiatric or psychological evidence at trial.15 This type of com-
pelled psychiatric examination raises serious constitutional questions as
noted recently by the United States Supreme Court in Estelle v.
Smith. 5' The Court held that the use of testimony based upon a com-
pelled psychiatric examination at a capital sentencing proceeding violated
the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights.' 52 Although the Court's
holding dealt only with the use of such evidence at a sentencing hear-
ing, 53 the holding might easily be applied to other settings in which de-
146. Id. § 19.2-175.
147. Houghtaling v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 309, 163 S.E.2d 560, cert. denied, 394 U.S.
991 (1968). Accord Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 747, 753, 204 S.E.2d 258, 263 (1974);
Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 1095, 254 S.E.2d 116, 119 (1979).
In Mason the Virginia Supreme Court relied on United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344
U.S. 561, 568 (1953), in which the United States Supreme Court held that states are not
required by the Constitution to provide a defendant with technical pre-trial assistance. But
see Note, Criminal Procedure, 66 VA. L. REV. 261, 264 (1980) (suggesting that the Virginia
Supreme Court's reliance on Baldi may be mistaken since Mason was accused of a capital
offense, unlike Baldi, which invokes a higher due process standard).
Nonetheless, defense counsel may deny his client's presentation of an insanity defense
due to the client's inability to pay psychiatric and legal fees. Profitt v. United States, 582
F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). In this case Proffitt did not have
the $10,000 which his attorney said it would cost to mount an insanity defense using private
counsel and a private psychiatrist. The court ruled this violated the defendant's right to
adequate representation by counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution. 582 F.2d at 856-57.
148. 572 F.2d 443, 445 (4th Cir. 1978).
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-168.1A (Cum. Supp. 1982).
150. Id. § 19.2-168.1B.
151. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
152. The fatal flaws were that the defendant was not advised prior to the examination of
his right to remain silent and that he was not allowed counsel during the examination. Com-
ment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Psychiatric Examinations, 50 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 275, 276 (1982) (discussing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 454).
153. The facts briefly stated are as follows: Smith was indicted for murder committed by
his accomplice during an armed robbery. A competency for trial examination was ordered by
the trial judge when the prosectuion announced plans to pursue the death penalty. The
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-fendants are compelled to submit to psychiatric examinations. 5'
In Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 55 the constitutionality of a compelled
psychiatric examination was at issue before the Virginia Supreme Court.
The defendant had been compelled to undergo a psychiatric evaluation to
determine his sanity at the time of his alleged crime (murder).1 56 His ap-
peal principally was based upon the state's lack of authority to so compel
him;157 however, he also challenged the constitutionality of a compelled
examination based on fifth and sixth amendment grounds.5 8 Finding that
the state had the power to compel examination, the court avoided the
constitutional challenge on the grounds that it was a new issue on
appeal. 5
9
Thus after Shifflett,6 0 and especially in light of Estelle v. Smith,'6 ' the
constitutionality of Virginia's compelled psychiatric examination con-
tained in section 19.2-168.1(b) of the Virginia Code must seriously be
questioned.
IV. CONCLUSION
A criminal defendant, in Virginia, is presumed to be sane until proven
otherwise. 16 ' This has the effect of making insanity an affirmative de-
fense, thus it is incumbent upon the defendant to raise the issue of his
insanity' 63 and to convince the jury that he was insane at the time of the
offense.8 4 The standard for insanity in Virginia as set forth in
defendant was found competent to stand trial and a jury convicted Smith of murder. Texas
law requires the jury, in a separate sentencing hearing, to evaluate a three part test prior to
imposing the death penalty in which the major element is whether the defendant poses a
continuing threat to society. The jury relied upon the testimony of the psychiatrist who had
examined Smith at the compelled competency hearing to find that Smith was a continuing
threat and sentenced him to death. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 456-57.
154. Comment, supra note 152, at 284. The Court left the door wide open to apply its
rationale to an assertion of the insanity defense. The Second Circuit had held several years
ago that a defendant's disclosures in an examination were "non-testimonial" and thus not
covered by the fifth amendment. United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970). However, Estelle, 451 U.S. at 463 explicitly rejects this
position, holding that since the state's only evidence in support of the death penalty was
from the defendant's statements in the examination then the fifth amendment is implicated.
Comment, supra note 152, at 284.
155. 221 Va. 760, 274 S.E.2d 305 (1981).
156. Id. at 765, 275 S.E.2d at 307.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 769, 275 S.E.2d at 311.
159. Id.
160. 221 Va. 760, 274 S.E.2d 305 (1981).
161. 451 U.S. at 454.
162. See supra note 85.
163. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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DeJarnette v. Commonwealth 65 is essentially a M'Naghten16 6 "right-
wrong" test modified by irresistible impulse.167 If a defendant intends to
assert an insanity defense, he must give the Commonwealth ten days
written notice 68 and may be compelled to submit to a psychiatric evalua-
tion.169 If found not guilty by reason of insanity, the individual may be
committed for one year, at least, if the judge is satisfied that the individ-
ual is dangerous and mentally ill.
170
Virginia's procedure for dealing with the insanity defense is, on bal-
ance, eminently reasonable. While some may disapprove of placing the
burden of persuasion as to insanity on the defendant, the practice is
clearly constitutional.17 1 The revised post-acquittal commitment proce-
dure has recently been upheld as well.17 2 There exists serious doubt, how-
ever, as to the constitutionality of Virginia's compelled psychiatric exami-
nation provision in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Estelle v.
Smith.17 4
The defense of not guilty by reason of insanity is but one tool which
allows our society to adjust to those individuals who do not meet the cri-
teria of the average citizen. It is entirely consistent with the "prevalent
modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the of-
fender and not merely the crime."1 75 As such, the insanity defense contin-
ues to occupy a very vital role in our criminal justice system. The insanity
defense in Virginia probably will be revised in accordance with the sug-
gestions made by the Insanity Plea Task Force, whose recommendations
have been discussed. In addition to these modifications, it is urged that
the procedure governing the compelled psychiatric examination of a de-
fendant be reexamined closely in view of Estelle v. Smith.176
Steven D. Gravely
165. 75 Va. 867, 875 (1881).
166. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
167. See supra note 65.
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-168.1A (Cum. Supp. 1982).
169. Id. § 19.2-168.1B.
170. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
172. Harms v. Ballone, 681 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1982).
173. See supra note 169.
174. 451 U.S. at 454.
175. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
176. 451 U.S. at 454.
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